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RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE NLRB
By WALIER H. MALONEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concern currently expressed by several large and
powerful national organizations about racial and religious
discrimination in employment, and the attention given to
the problem by both major political parties at their 1960
conventions,' portend renewed efforts to enact federal legis-
lation providing legal remedies to persons suffering such
job discrimination. Proposals to enact federal fair em-
ployment legislation date back many years.2 However,
the problem of discrimination in employment, particularly
among Negroes, has been aggravated by the swiftness of
industrial automation in displacing unskilled workers, and
the telling effect of recessions, such as the one which took
place in 1958. The reason that Negroes and other minority
groups feel the pinch of unemployment with such dispro-
* Of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars; B.S.S. 1951, George-
town College; LL.B. 1953, Georgetown Law School; LL.M. 1954, University
of Michigan.
'The Democratic platform adopted on July 21, 1960 at Los Angeles,
provided:
"The right to a job requires action to break down artificial and
arbitrary barriers to employment based on age, race, sex, religion or
national origin.
Unemployment strikes hardest at workers over 40, minority groups,
young people, and women. We will not achieve full employment until
prejudice against these workers is wiped out...
The new Democratic Administration will support Federal legislation
establishing a Fair Employment Practices Commission to secure ef-
fectively for everyone the right to equal opportunity to employment."
The Republican platform adopted on July 27, 1960 at Chicago provided:
"We pledge:
Continued support for legislation to establish a Commission on Equal
Job Opportunity to make permanent and to expand with legislative
backing the excellent work being performed by the President's Com-
mittee on Government Contracts;
Appropriate legislation to end the discriminatory membership prac-
tices of some labor union locals, unless such practices are eradicated
promptly by the labor unions themselves;
Use of the full-scale review of existing state laws, and of prior
proposals for federal legislation, to eliminate discrimination in em-
ployment now being conducted by the Civil Rights Commission, for
guidance in our objective of developing a Federal-State program in
the employment area;
Special consideration of training programs aimed at developing the
skills of those now working in marginal agricultural employment so
that they can obtain employment in industry, notably in the new
industries moving into the South."
See, for example, the report of President Truman's Civil Rights Com-
mittee. "To Secure These Rights" (1948).
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portionate severity is that they are employed largely in
unskilled and semi-skilled positions in manufacturing,
where cyclical unemployment is greatest, and where they
lack sufficient seniority to be protected during mass lay-
offs.' "Last to be hired and first to be fired" has been a
long-standing complaint that has assumed graver impli-
cations. This concentration of Negroes and other minority
groups in mass production industries has, in turn, been
accentuated by the difficulties which Negroes 'have en-
countered in joining various railroad brotherhoods and in
entering apprenticeship programs leading to full member-
ship in the 'higher-paid building trades unions.4 In 1955,
at the time of the merger of the AFL and the CIO, the CIO in-
fluenced the newly-formed federation to adopt a civil rights
clause5 in its constitution. When, on January 20, 1960,
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, at its convention
in Cleveland, Ohio, voted to abolish a "whites only" clause
in its constitution, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen was left as the only AFL-CIO affiliate to
maintain a formal "lily-white" policy respecting member-
ship. However, the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, in pressing the AFL-CIO for en-
forcement of its constitutional declaration, has felt that
labor practices, at least in some locals, have failed to con-
form to principles enunciated at ithe international level.7
The widely publicized refusal of Local 26, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, in Washington, D.C., to
refer Negroes for employment in the construction of a new
office building for the House of Representatives, and the
action of AFL-CIO President George Meany to circum-
vent this refusal, serve to underscore the merit in the
complaint as well as the determination of labor leadership
to put policy into practice.
As pressure again begins to mount for federal legislative
action to end job discrimination, it is well to review the
present status of federal law respecting racial discrimina-
tees, particularly with reference to the agency charged with
the responsibility of supervising wide areas of labor-man-
ODuring the 1958 recession, the rate of unemployment among Negro
workers was more than twice the unemployment rate among white workers.
In November 1958, 4.8% of white males were unemployed, while 11.4% of
Negro males were without jobs. Fortune, March 1959, 191.
See America, Feb. 6, 1960, 544.
'The clause commits the AFL-CIO "to encourage all workers without
regard to race, creed, color, or national origin to share in the full benefits
of union organization."
6 See Business Week, January 10, 1959, 78.
'See Business Week, May 17, 1958, 139.
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agement relations in most large-scale industries. Such a re-
view of NLRB and related cases will not only serve to set
forth the status of the law in the absence of Congressional
action dealing specifically with racial discrimination in
employment, but may also suggest remedies which can
be best adopted in conformity with experience under estab-
lished procedures.
II. FEDERAL COURT LITIGATION ON JOB DISCRIMINATION
A. Court Litigation under the Railway Labor Act
Despite the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the willingness of the Supreme Court
to find its similar import in the Fifth Amendment,' there
are no federal constitutional restrictions as such on racial
or religious discrimination in private employment. The
historic and consistent view of the Supreme Court has
been that these constitutional provisions serve as limita-
tions only upon governmental instrumentalities, not upon
individual citizens acting in a private capacity.' Accord-
ingly, since unions do not fall into the category of govern-
mental instrumentalities, their actions are not directly in-
hibited by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Hence,
whenever federal courts or the NLRB have intervened to
grant relief from racial discrimination, such relief has not
been premised upon constitutional grounds, but upon the
basis of statutory provisions and a general judicial disap-
proval of the distinctions between employees as "irrelevant
and invidious."'10
While the principal thrust of state FEPC legislation is
aimed at bias 'by employers, the vast majority of federal
cases on the subject are directed at discriminatory situa-
8 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the District of Columbia
school desegregation case. Because the case arose In a territory under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, the plaintiffs could
not cite the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
obtain relief, since that provision restricts only the several states. How-
ever, the Supreme Court relied upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to afford relief similar to that given to plaintiffs who brought
desegregation suits against state instrumentalities.
0 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10 Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). An excellent example
of Justice Murphy's philosophy can be found in his vigorous concurring
opinion in the Steele case. Rather than relying upon the statutory basis
of the majority opinion, he stated that the action of the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen in discriminating against Negroes
infringed upon a constitutional right. It was his belief that the Consti-
tution of the United States forbids economic discrimination applied under
the authority of law against anyone on the basis of race or color, and
he preferred that his brethren of the Court base their position upon the
fundamental law. Id., 208.
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tions caused principally by unions. It should also be noted
that federal litigation attacking racial discrimination in
employment did not originate in the vast area of interstate
commerce subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB, but
rather in the railroad industry under the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act.11 The Steele case, 12 brought by a group
of Negro firemen against a railroad carrier and the Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, was the first
significant decision by the Supreme Court dealing affirma-
tively with the question of racial discrimination in employ-
ment and provided the basic rationale for many future
decisions, by both court and board.
In Steele, the plaintiffs alleged that the carrier and the
union had entered into an agreement setting up a seniority
system which eventually would spell the complete exclusion
of Negroes from situations as firemen. The Supreme Court,
in granting injunctive relief, laid great emphasis on the
fact that the union in question was selected in accordance
with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, and was
thereby accorded a special statutory privilege to serve as
the exclusive bargaining representative for an entire class
or craft. Having attained the exclusive right to bargain
for all firemen, the union also assumed the responsibility
of advancing the interests of all firemen, both white and
Negro. Hence, it was not free to enhance the economic
positions of some of its bargaining constituents at the ex-
pense of others whom it was obligated to represent. To use
a term familiar to the common law, the union, unlike any
private, voluntary association, 'became, in effect, a trustee
for all firemen, and the Court would see to it that it fulfilled
its fiduciary duty to all intended beneficiaries.
At the same time, the Supreme Court affirmed, albeit
not in a racial context, the duty of an NLRB-certified union
to represent with equal solicitude all employees for whom
it was certified. In Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 3 an
employer was found guilty of violating former Section 8 (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act. He had entered into
a closed shop contract with a certified union, which con-
tained a provision requiring him to discharge all employees
who had been members of a rival union that lost a repre-
sentation election. At that time, the processes of the Board
could not reach the activities of labor organizations, so the
Supreme Court had to strike at union practices in an in-
" 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et 8eq.
2 Supra, n. 10.
8 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
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direct way. The Supreme Court clearly stated that the
union was under a duty to represent all employees for
whom it was certified. Accordingly, it could not enter into
a collective bargaining agreement which would require
the discharge of regular employees because they had been
members of a rival organization. Therefore, when an em-
ployer gave effect to such an agreement, he was guilty of
an unfair labor practice. This decision 'has been frequently
cited, in cases involving industries subject to NLRB juris-
diction, for the same proposition contained in the Steele
decision, namely, that racial discrimination by a labor
organization in making a collective bargaining agreement
violates the union's duty to render equal service to all
employees it is supposed to represent.
Subsequent litigation 'has served to reinforce the obli-
gation of unions to bargain for all their constituents on a
non-discriminatory basis. Interestingly enough, this obliga-
tion has largely 'been developed by federal courts, exercis-
ing their general equity jurisdiction, and not by federal
administrative agencies in the course of their normal
administration of federal labor laws, despite the fact that
the Court decisions have been premised upon statutes fall-
ing within the administrative responsibility of these
agencies.
While the Steele case forbade racially discriminatory
contracts within a single class or craft of railroad em-
ployees, the Howard14 case, coming a few years later, ex-
tended the same rationale to prevent a racially segregated
union from pre-empting jobs from Negroes who were mem-
bers of another 'historically recognized craft of railroad
employees. In Howard, the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, by threatening a strike, forced the Frisco Railroad
to enter into an agreement reserving exclusively to train-
men certain tasks which had formerly been done, in part,
by Negro train porters. This racial jurisdictional dispute
was resolved by the Supreme Court by granting an in-
junction forbidding the enforcement of the agreement on
the ground that it had been unfairly concluded.
Conley v. Gibson15 further extended the protection of
the Steele doctrine to cover situations in which racial dis-
crimination was practiced by a union against its own mem-
bers. In Conley, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks organized its members into segregated locals. The
"'Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
1355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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negotiating committee was made up exclusively of white
men. The committee, acting on behalf of both locals, con-
cluded an agreement with the railroad carrier that would
have required the replacement of forty-five Negro clerks
in the Houston freight house with white clerks. The plaintiffs
also complained that the committee failed to do its duty to
adjust individual grievances filed 'by Negro employees.
The Supreme Court had no difficulty in finding that the
negotiating committee failed to fulfill its statutory duty
to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit
by engaging in the conduct alleged. The Court also stated
that the duty of the bargaining agent to represent all
employees equally extends not only to the formation of a
collective agreement but also governs the subsequent ad-
ministration of the agreement as well.
B. Recent Court cases in "NLRB Industries"
Within the much 'broader jurisdictional scope of the
National Labor Relations Act, racial discrimination has
been more difficult to attack. Both the courts and the NLRB
have been mindful of the Supreme Court teaching in regard
to 'discrimination under Section (a) (3) 16 of the National
Labor Relations Act. Lest the 'broad terms of the statute be
further expanded by administrative or judicial fiat, the
High Court issued the reminder - "Nor does this section
(8 (a) (3)) outlaw discrimination in employment as such;
only such 'discrimination as encourages or discourages
membership in a labor organization is proscribed. ' 17 Much
of the support for NLRB action in the field of racial dis-
crimination has come, by analogy, from the Wallace case,
supra, which was not decided in the context of racial con-
flict. Because of the fact that Section 8(a) (3) is not de-
signed to eliminate racial or religious discrimination, legal
assaults on such practices within the framework of the
Taft-Hartley Act 'have been predicated upon Section 9 (a).
This section provides that "representatives designated or
selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the
"I Section 8(a) (3), now codified in 29 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1960) § 158(a) (3),
is the principal provision of the Labor Management Relations Act dealing
generally with discrimination in employment. It provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization ......
Section 8(b) (2) now codified in 29 U.S.C.A. (1956) § 158(b) (2), forbids
a labor organization from causing or attempting to cause an employer to
engage in such discriminatory conduct.
"I Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954).
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majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Necessarily, the liti-
gation in this area has primarily dealt with instances of
union-generated racial discrimination in violation of a
statutory bargaining duty, rather than with racial or re-
ligious practices by employers in the absence of union
causation. The Supreme Court has spoken on this point in
only the most desultory and cryptic fashion.
Two principal court cases in "NLRB industries" involve
racial hiring bias. In Williams v. Yellow Cab. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pa.," a group of Negro cab drivers in Pittsburgh
brought suit in District Court against the Teamsters and
the Yellow Cab Company for an unlawful conspiracy. They
charged that the defendants had entered into a collective
bargaining agreement which would relegate Negro cab
drivers employed by the Yellow Cab 'Company to less de-
sirable and lower paying assignments than those given to
white cab drivers. The union here involved had been
recognized by the company on the basis of a showing of
majority representation, rather than by Board election and
certification. The plaintiffs charged that the union was
failing to fulfill its statutory 'bargaining duty, under Sec-
tion 9, to represent "all employees." In dismissing the com-
plaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, while following the basic concept of the Civil
Rights Cases,19 drew sharp distinction between the obli-
gations of certified and uncertified bargaining agents. In
so deciding, the Court ignored the language in Section 9 (a)
relating to bargaining representatives that are "designated
or selected." Since the union herein 'had achieved its
position as bargaining representative by majority desig-
nation rather than by Board election and certification, the
Court felt it was powerless to interfere with any contract
it might conclude. It distinguished the union's status from
the position of the union in the Steele case on the basis that
the Teamsters herein had achieved their right to serve
as bargaining representative through the privately-made
choice of the employees, not through the issuance of a cer-
tificate 'by a governmental agency. It is interesting to
speculate what the Third 'Circuit would 'have done, had
the same Negro plaintiffs first filed a timely representation
19200 F. 2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1952).
19 Supra, n. 9.
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petition, awaited a Board election and certification of the
union, and then brought their suit in District Court against
a defendant who enjoyed a current certification as well as
a majority designation.
Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 23,20
is the second prominent court case in this area. In Syres,
two union locals, one restricted to white members and the
other restricted to Negroes, were jointly certified as the
bargaining representatives for all employees at an oil re-
finery. However, the negotiating committee which con-
cluded the collective bargaining agreement was composed
exclusively of white men. It concluded an agreement with
the company which effectively froze Negro members into
an unpromotable status. Several Negro employees filed
an action in the United States District Court to nullify
the agreement. On appeal in the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the case was dismissed without the drawing
of any nice distinction between certified and uncertified
unions. Instead, the Court used procedural grounds to dis-
pose of the case. It held that inasmuch as no federal statute
specifically authorized the suit, a federal court did not, in
the absence of diversity of citizenship between the parties,
have jurisdiction to grant relief. The Supreme Court of the
United States promptly reversed the Fifth Circuit, in a
per curiam decision without opinion, citing, inter alia, its
previous decisions in the Steele and Howard cases. How-
ever, it did not give any further explanation of its views on
the merits of the case, and thus leaves -the impact of its
decision open to much speculation.
III. NLRB LITIGATION IN THE AREA OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
From the earliest days of the National Labor Relations
Act, the NLRB 'has been confronted with problems involv-
ing racial discrimination and racial segregation. These
problems have, for the most part, arisen in three different
legal postures: (1) determinations of appropriate collective
2223 F. 2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd 350 U.S. 892 (1955). The progress
of this particular case Illustrates what may occur as the practical result
of seeking legal redress from racial discrimination. When this case was
remanded, the plaintiffs confined their demand for relief to damages for
past injuries, rather than pressing their demand for an injunction. The
discriminatory contract drawn into question had expired, and had been
replaced by a new agreement which was not attacked. Presumably, the
parties eliminated the provisions which were the gravamen of the original
complaint.
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bargaining units; (2) enforcement of the duty of a certified
bargaining representative to fulfill a duty implicit in certifi-
cation to represent equally all members of the bargaining
unit; and (3) appeals to racial bias to influence the outcome
of representation elections. The Board has never attempted
to eliminate racial or religious discrimination in hiring
by the citation of either labor or management for the com-
mission of an unfair labor practice. Nor has it attempted
to eliminate racial segregation within labor unions.2'
It has been the consistent policy of the Board to disre-
gard racial considerations in determining the appropriate-
ness of bargaining units. In so acting, the Board has ma-
terially reduced the likelihood of emotion-charged racial
jurisdictional disputes which have characterized much of
the above-mentioned litigation in the railroad industry. In
American Tobacco Company,22 the Board found that both
Negro and white production and maintenance employees
performed essentially the same functions and therefore
should be included in the same bargaining unit. Not long
thereafter, it reaffirmed this same policy in a granite monu-
ment factory,23 a public utility,24 and a steel processing
plant.25 However, the Board has permitted racially segre-
gated locals to serve as the joint representative in an over-
all unit.26
After formulating this policy with respect to bargain-
ing units, the Board began to look at the matter of racial
discrimination in employment in a somewhat broader con-
text. In Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyards,27 the Board was
confronted with a case involving potential discrimination
against both Negroes and orientals. The problem was fur-
ther complicated by a craft determination problem. In its
opinion, the Board stated, by way of dicta, that it had
"grave doubt whether a union which discriminatorily
denies membership to employees on the basis of race
may nevertheless bargain as the exclusive representative
of an appropriate unit composed in part of the excluded
race."28 The Board also hinted that it was considering
whether or not racial discrimination violated the rights
m See Norfolk Southern Bus Company, 83 N.L.R.B. 115 (1949) ; Veneer
Products, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 492 (1949).
- 9 N.L.R.B. 579 (1938).
n Interstate Granite Corporation, 11 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1939).
Georgia Power Company, 32 N.L.R.B. 692 (1941).
Aetna Iron and Steel Company, 35 N.L.R.B. 136 (1941).
'"Atlanta Oak Flooring, 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945).
- 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943).
-Id., 1016.
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of employees conferred by Section 7 of the Act.29 How-
ever, since the unions involved had indicated that they
would cease any racially discriminatory conduct, the Board
announced that it would not pass upon the merits of these
issues.
Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyards contains some of the
strongest language against racial discrimination that the
Board has yet uttered. It soon resolved its stated doubt
concerning the eligibility of unions practicing racial ex-
clusion to serve as bargaining agents when it decided Carter
Manufacturing Company.30 Without any express reference
to the Steele decision and doctrine therein announced by
the Supreme Court for the railroad industry, the Board,
in effect, adopted the same concept for industries subject
to its own jurisdiction. It stated that a union was obligated
to provide equal representation for all employees in the
bargaining unit, regardless of race, color, creed, or national
origin. The Board indicated, without so holding, that if a
union fulfilled its obligation of equal representation, the
Board would not inquire whether or not the union opened
its membership rolls to all employees. It further said that if
evidence were brought to its attention, after certification,
that the union was not fulfilling its statutory obligation,
the Board would consider rescinding the certification.
In Larus and Brother Company,31 the Board followed
the rationale announced in Steele and Wallace 'by holding
that the certification given to a union should not be a vehicle
for racial discrimination. It asserted its right and obliga-
tion to set aside a certification upon proof that the certifi-
fled union was guilty of racial discrimination in failing
to represent all employees as Section 9 requires. However,
the Board further recognized that its power to remedy
unfair labor practices did not extend to eliminating un-
democratic practices within a labor organization. Later,
in Hughes Tool Company,32 the Board actually did revoke
(on a provisional basis) the certification of a union which,
while serving as an exclusive bargaining representative
of both white and Negro workers, charged white and Negro
"Former Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, then in effect,
provided:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protec-
tion."
0 59 N.L.R.B. 804 (1944).
62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
- 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
[VOL. XXI
1961] DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 229
employees vastly different sums for processing their
grievances.
In a few instances, the Board has been asked to find an
employer guilty of conduct in violation of Section 8(a) (1)
of the Act 3 by making appeals to racial prejudice during
the course of a union organizing campaign. In these cases,
racial appeals have generally 'been regarded as one facet
of the employer's overall conduct and as evidence, to be
considered along with facts and circumstances, in ascertain-
ing whether or not the employer 'has engaged in a general
pattern of coercive anti-union conduct. Appeals to racial
prejudice, in and of themselves, do not amount to an unfair
labor practice. 4
In The American Thread Company,35 the employer
warned his employees that, if the union won an impending
election, Negroes would work side by side with white em-
ployees in the same spinning alleys and would share the
same toilet facilities. This statement, coupled with other
activity, was found to be sufficiently coercive to constitute
a violation of Section 8(a) (1).
In Empire Manufacturing Corporation,6 a similar state-
ment was regarded, in the setting of a southern community,
as sufficiently coercive to warrant a finding of an unfair
labor practice.
11 Section 8(a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended,
29 U.S.C.A. (1956) § 158(a) (1), provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7;"
Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. (1956) § 157, provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection .... 9
'Rapp Brothers Co. Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1950). In Coca-Cola
Bottling Company of Louisville Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 490 (1954), the Board,
in finding a violation of Section 8(a) (1), rejected an interesting argument
advanced by an employer in defense of his conduct. The respondent drew
an analogy from Section 9 requirements and argued that a union, such
as the one therein concerned, which practices racial discrimination is not,
under Board law, fulfilling its duty under Section 9 as a labor organization.
He then reasoned that such a union, which would be subject to having its
certification revoked, is not a "labor organization" within the meaning
of Section 7. Therefore, it would follow that any interference respecting
such a union would not violate Section 8(a) (1) since it was not entitled to
protection under Section 7. In rejecting this defense, the Board preserved
its policy of treating racial discrimination within unions under representa-
tion law, rather than in an unfair labor context.
84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949).
120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958).
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IV. PoTENTiALrrIS OF THE NLRB IN THE AREA OF RACIAL
AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The NLRB has realized the inherent limitations of the
National Labor Relations Act in affording an effective
remedy for racial and religious discrimination in employ-
ment. Congress clearly did not have this problem in mind
when it brought the Board and its Act into existence, nor
when it expanded the powers of the Board in 1947." 7 As
the law stands now, the NLRB simply is not and cannot
be an FEPC. Whenever racial and religious problems 'have
arisen in the course of Board litigation, they have come
up incidentally in some peripheral context of the adminis-
tration of the Act.
It has been ably argued that the Board could, in filling
up the broad interstices of the Act, assume a more vigorous
and comprehensive role in eliminating racial job bias."8 It
has been suggested that the duty of a union to bargain under
Section 8(b) (3) of the Act encompasses a duty owed to its
constituents as well as to its economic protagonist. Accord-
ingly, racial discrimination in employment, or at least in
collective bargaining, would be deemed as unfair labor
practices. It is submitted that such an argument does not
accord due deference to Congress.
As recent as August, 1959, when Congress was consider-
ing the "Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959," 9 it deliberately refused to legislate in the area
of racial discrimination in employment. On August 12, 1959,
when the House of Representatives was debating this
measure, Representative Adam Clayton Powell introduced
an amendment to the bill providing:
"... that no labor organization shall discriminate
unfairly in its representation of all employees in the
negotiation and administration of collective bargain-
ing agreements, or refuse membership, segregate, or
expel any person on the ground of race, religion, color,
sex, or national origin.' 40
After a brief discussion, the House rejected this amend-
ment -by a teller vote of 215 to 160.41 In so doing, Congress
Supra, n. 17.
8 Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Villanova L. Rev. 151 (1957).
Public Law 257, 86 Cong., 1st Session, 73 STAT. 519 (1959).
105 Cong. Rec. (Daily ed., Aug. 12, 1959), 14399.
41 105 Cong. Rec. (Daily ed., Aug. 12, 1959), 14391. It was suggested in the
course of the debate on this amendment that it had been introduced as a
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not only failed to outlaw racial and religious discrimination
in employment or collective bargaining; it affirmatively re-j ected a proposal making such matters the subject of federal
law. This action was but another manifestation of the
present reluctance of Congress to enact fair employment
practices legislation or anything remotely touching upon it.
However compelling the reasons may seem to be for
federal action in the area of racial and religious job bias,
it is submitted that it is of paramount importance to accede
to the expressed wishes of the body which the Constitution
has designated for the creation of new law and new policy.
When Congress has failed to set such a policy, an adminis-
trative body would be ill-advised to attempt, by a flanking
action, what elected representatives have declined to ac-
complish by frontal assaults.
Despite its past actions, there are clear prospects for yet
another drive in Congress to enact legislation dealing with
racial and religious discrimination in employment. It would
not be out of keeping with a survey of past administrative
and judicial experience in this area to suggest a possible
avenue for future legislative approach. The spectre gen-
erally presented to the public by opponents of such action
is that any law on the subject would mean "jail-sentence
FEPC." This inflammatory image connotes a new, im-
personal federal bureau, staffed with hordes of government
agents who are assigned to go about the country as person-
nel policemen, forcing thousands of reluctant employers
to hire Negroes or go to jail. This image has been quite
effective in marshalling opposition to any congressional
efforts to deal with the subject.
Hostility to federal job bias legislation cannot reason-
ably be expected to subside, even in the face of the most
modest proposal. However, the degree and intensity of
such opposition may become modified if the proposal ad-
vanced is clearly remedial in character and does not con-
tain express criminal sanctions. This practical end may
be accomplished by a proposal making racial and religious
discrimination a new and distinct unfair labor practice
straitegem designed primarily to defeat the enactment of the principal meas-
ure. Hence some might argue that Congress was not really opposed to
eliminating racial and religious discrimination from labor organizations
and from collective bargaining; it merely opposed doing so In a manner
which might have jeopardized the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act.
Suffice It to say that, whatever the motives Congress might have had, it
clearly rejected the proposed amendment, and has not seen fit subse-
quently to enact the substance of Representative Powell's suggestion into
law.
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on the part of either labor organizations or employers, to
be remedied under the established procedures of the NLRB.
It is true that the ultimate sanction for continuing unfair
labor practices is criminal contempt of the enforcement
decree of a federal Circuit Court of Appeals. However, this
sanction is rarely invoked, and only against the most
obdurate and contumacious respondents. Between the fil-
ing of an unfair labor practice charge and the institution of
contempt proceedings, there exist many opportunities for
compromise, settlement, and voluntary compliance. It is
axiomatic that the NLRB may fashion, in cases which
reach it in the course of litigation, only those orders which
are remedial in character; it may not properly issue a puni-
tive order. This approach may accommodate itself most
fittingly to the end of making future congressional policy
come alive as a valuable and functioning reality.
Furthermore, the processes of the NLRB have long been
geared to the sophisticated task of assessing discriminatory
motive and intent in an employment situation. When actual
cases of racial and religious discrimination are litigated, the
matters in issue will probably involve, in large measure,
highly subjective factual questions, rather than candid
practices and policies of discrimination. In short, the en-
forcement problems inherent in any legislation dealing
with racial job bias are closely analogous to problems which
the NLRB has been handling for over twenty-five years.
When the wholly legitimate necessities of making apolitical
record are brought into contact with the equally practical
requirements of administrative viability, it may be more
propitious for a legislative body to expand the functions
of a tested administrative vehicle, whatever may be its
limitations, rather than set in motion wholly new practices
and procedures. The unfair labor practice approach to
handling racial and religious discrimination in employment
can well afford Congress the precedent and promise it needs
in order to act in this delicate matter.
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